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International Paretianism: A Defense
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach1
July 12, 2012

Abstract. A treaty satisfies what we call International Paretianism if it advances the
interests of all states that join it, so that no state is made worse off. The principle might
seem obvious, but it rules out nearly all the major proposals for a climate treaty,
including proposals advanced by academics and by government officials. We defend
International Paretianism, and for that reason urge commentators in the debate over
climate justice to abandon efforts to right past wrongs, redistribute wealth, and achieve
other abstract ideals through a climate treaty.

In Climate Change Justice, we argued that a viable climate treaty must comply with
International Paretianism, the principle that at least one state must benefit from the treaty and no
state party will be made worse off by the treaty. A number of critics of our arguments appear to
assume that we intended International Paretianism as an ethical principle. In fact, International
Paretianism is not an ethical principle but a feasibility constraint.2 Our claim is that it is idle to
argue for a climate treaty on ethical grounds if the ethically required climate treaty will surely be
rejected. The challenge for commentators and scholars ought to be to propose a climate treaty
that is both ethically acceptable and politically feasible. However, there has been very little
discussion of political feasibility. The focus on ethics alone has resulted in numerous proposals
that have little chance of being accepted. Pursuit of these proposals has resulted in little progress
in reducing emissions. The world would be better served, and a more ethical outcome achieved,
if the focus were instead on feasible treaties that actually reduce emissions.
In Climate Change Justice we did not provide a full defense of International Paretianism.
That lacuna may account for some of the criticisms we have received. Some commentators argue
that International Paretianism is not defensible because it blocks ethically obligatory treaties and
favors rich countries like the United States. It confuses the “is” with the “ought.” Another
criticism is that International Paretianism, as we define it, is incoherent because it defines a
state’s interest to include a state’s moral obligations, in which case International Paretianism
cannot serve as an independent constraint. A third criticism, which we have not (yet) heard but
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which believe should be addressed, is that International Paretianism, if taken to its logical
conclusion, implies that states never act ethically, in which case debate about the ethics of
climate change is idle.
In this essay, we respond to these criticisms. After explaining what International
Paretianism means, we make three major points. First, participants in the climate debate should
advocate treaties that are not only ethical but also feasible. Second, International Paretianism is a
reasonable approximation of feasibility, although there may be other principles that better
capture what is feasible. Third, International Paretianism does not necessarily imply that states
never act ethically, but instead helps focus ethical debate on realistic alternatives.
I. What Is International Paretianism and Why Adopt It?
The Pareto principle in economics is an ethical standard, which provides that a project is
socially desirable if it makes at least one person better off than in the status quo and makes no
person worse off. Most economists and, as far as we know, philosophers believe that the Pareto
principle is a sufficient condition for social desirability, at least if one accepts the broadly
welfarist assumptions of economics and modern public policy, and defines well-being properly.
However, nearly everyone agrees that the Pareto principle is too strong: it bars projects that may
be socially desirable, like a vaccine that will help thousands but cause minor injuries to a few
people who cannot be adequately compensated (perhaps because they cannot be identified).
Although we borrow Vilfredo Pareto’s name for International Paretianism, we do not
classify it as an ethical principle. International Paretianism is satisfied for an international project
such as a treaty that makes at least one state that joins the project better off than in the status quo,
while harming no other states. Buried in this definition are a number of assumptions. First, states
will act so as to advance their self-interest. Second, a state’s self-interest is its perceived selfinterest, not an “objective” self-interest.3 Third, a state’s self-interest can include ethical
interests, but whether it does is an empirical question and a state’s ethical interests may vary by
state.4
International Paretianism differs from the Pareto principle because a project that makes a
state better off might make some citizens of the state worse off. If a state defines its national
interest in a way that takes account of the well-being of few of its citizens, it may enter a treaty
that complies with International Paretianism but that has extremely bad consequences for many
people. That is why International Paretianism is not even a weak ethical principle, unlike the
Pareto principle.
3
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What is the point of International Paretianism if it is not an ethical principle? It is a
feasibility constraint. It is a device to discipline our thinking to ensure that our recommendations
can actually be implemented.
Another term one could use to describe International Paretianism is “participation
constraint.” This term is frequently used in the economics literature as a condition of a
“mechanism” that is designed to elicit information from people for (usually) socially desirable
ends. The economics literature focuses a great deal of energy discussing “second-best” projects
that make people better off than in the status quo but are not first-best in the sense that without
constraints people could be even better off. These projects are desirable but not perfect because
the theoretically perfect projects are inconsistent with people’s incentives, that is, people will not
participate in them and hence (in our words) they are not feasible.
To use a standard example from economics, a government policy in which people are
told to voluntarily reveal their income and asked to pay taxes on the basis of it, while not
subjecting them to audits or sanctions if they fail to do so, violates the participation constraint
because people would have no incentive to comply with the policy. They will instead conceal
their income. A tax policy that complies with participation constraints must make people at least
as well off if they comply with the policy than if they cheat. Such a policy is the ethically
preferred policy even though it is inferior to the policy of voluntary compliance in a world in
which participation constraints were assumed away. Thus, the economic literature focuses on the
set of feasible policies, and attempts to determine the best policy within that feasible set.
Philosophers also use feasibility constraints in considering the appropriate structure of
political institutions. For example, John Rawls, in Political Liberalism argues that a conception
of justice must be realistic in that it must be capable of forming the basis of a stable society. A
stable society is one that is “willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its
politically active citizens.”5 Thomas Nagel argues that “the motivations that are morally required
of us must be practically and psychologically possible, otherwise our political theory will be
utopian in the bad sense.”6 How tight these constraints are assumed to be—how much of human
nature and which political institutions are taken as given—varies widely in the philosophical
literature.7
5
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A recent book by Elizabeth Anderson on racial discrimination provides an example of the
use of feasibility constraints by philosophers.8 She points out that ideal theory can blind one to
proposals that improve society when those proposals would not lead to an ideal outcome.
Suppose, for example, that ideal theory dictates that society be color-blind, meaning that
government may never condition legal duties and benefits on race. Ideal theory would then
block affirmative action programs. But, Anderson argues, if we start with the world as it is, and
observe that African-Americans experience various disabilities caused by racism not embodied
in the law, we may conclude that affirmative action is morally justifiable. It violates ideal theory
but is justified as a means for achieving better outcomes in the non-ideal world.
Proponents of aggressive climate treaties accept feasibility constraints, although they are
most often implicit and not acknowledged. Consider for example the claim that the right to
emissions should be allocated on a per-capita basis. The claim is justified on the intuition that
common resources belong equally to everyone. Proponents of this view do not argue that all
resources (such as natural resources within the territory of a state) should be distributed, even
though the logic of their argument does not limit equal sharing to resources that happen to lie
outside of states’ territory. We suspect the reason they do not make this argument is that they
accept an implicit feasibility constraint that states would not agree to share resources located on
their territory, whatever the ethical merits of sharing. But proponents of an equal per capita
emissions allocation do not explain why their proposal is feasible when equal per capita
allocation of all resources is not. In fact, equal per capita allocation of emissions is no more
feasible than equal allocation of other resources which is why it is not fruitful to spend time
advocating either. Explicit acknowledgement of feasibility constraints would make this evident.
Failure to acknowledge and defend feasibility assumptions is a common problem in
writing about international relations. While commentators frequently rule out world government
as an institutional solution to problems they identify, presumably on feasibility grounds, they
endorse laws and institutional arrangements that are hardly less ambitious without explaining
how they are feasible if world government is not, or in any way clarifying their assumptions
about what is possible. These proposals include international federations, a democratic United
Nations, strong permanent courts with the power to compel nations to comply with their
judgments, rights to democratic participation that would apply to all countries in the world, other
strong rights such as rights to welfare and health care which are respected in virtually no country
outside Europe, and massive transfers of wealth from rich countries to poor countries.9
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This is not to deny that states have created some important international institutions that
have done some good, that aspirational statements may have value, or that norms of behavior
may change. There is room for ambitious scholarship. We should reflect on our moral ideals and
should be imaginative. But discussions aimed at creating institutions in the immediate future,
such as an international climate regime, need to be particularly sensitive to feasibility. Farreaching aspirations will have little effect and may in fact reduce the likelihood of reaching
agreement to the extent energy is wasted on efforts to reach a goal that is not within the bounds
of feasibility. Focus on ethically appealing but infeasible proposals is, we believe, one of the
reasons for the failure of climate negotiations so far. Given the urgency of reducing emissions,
this is troubling. It is far more ethical to have steely-eyed, hard-headed negotiators focused on
reaching an effective and enforceable agreement that actually reduces emissions than to spend
time trying to reach impossible goals while emissions continue to increase.
The challenge is to develop a criterion to distinguish the institutions that are feasible from
those that are not, and then limiting serious policy discussion to the former. The balance is not
easy. An approach that included no limits, such as an approach that denied the existence of states
or assumed transfers from wealthy states to poor states orders of magnitude larger than we have
ever seen, is not helpful. An approach that includes no room for ethical considerations leaves
nothing to discuss. We propose International Paretianism as an appropriate criterion.
International Paretianism is a more complex idea than the participation constraint used in
economics. In standard economic models, authors assume that people want to satisfy their
preferences, and typically this assumption boils down to a tractable claim that people want more
money rather than less money. The assumption is obviously simplistic, but it may be serviceable
enough in many policy contexts, for example, regarding payment of taxes or contributions to
public goods.
State interests are far more complex because they are constructed from some aggregation
of the interests of the people who control the state. Common experience tells us that states
frequently seek to increase national wealth, but they do not always do so. For example, states
may adopt trade policies that favor certain groups (say, firms that compete with importers) to
other groups (consumers and exporters), which reduce rather than increase national wealth or
well-being, as measured by GDP or other more sophisticated measures. In addition, states will
often adopt policy goals that are, or at least appear to be, based on ethical considerations. For
example, western nations rejected the international slave trade in the nineteenth century. Today,
many countries claim that human rights constrain their policy choices. Most rich states give
foreign aid, although probably only a small portion of it is truly altruistic, that is, based on a
concern for the well-being of foreigners rather than driven by strategic interests.

5

Still, any reasonable survey of international law and institutions suggests that a relatively
straightforward account of states’ interests goes a long way to explaining what we observe and
what we do not observe.10 The vast majority of treaties involve humdrum day-to-day things:
extradition, taxation, maintaining embassies, protecting foreigners and their property, and so
forth. A number of multilateral treaties set communication standards, provide for trade, establish
fisheries, and so forth. There are also arms control agreements, base agreements, overflight
agreements, and much else. All of these treaties are the result of negotiations between
governments in which governments try to obtain particular benefits for their citizens through
mutual exchange. While no doubt some governments make mistakes and end up with treaties
that harm rather than benefit them, even these treaties can be easily renegotiated, so it would be
suprising if the vast majority of treaties did not comply with International Paretianism.
The closest analogy to a climate treaty is the Montreal Protocol. The United States and
other major countries agreed to cut back on chlorofluorocarbons in order to reduce the size of the
ozone hole. But the United States approached Europe for treaty negotiations after the United
States had concluded that even unilateral action would serve its interest; a treaty would help
share the burdens.11 The Montreal Protocol almost certainly complied with International
Paretianism. Then there are the human rights treaties, which might seem inconsistent with
International Paretianism. But the empirical literature on human rights treaties suggest that even
they comply with International Paretianism. The treaties did not require liberal democracies to
change their practices in most cases, and where they did, the liberal democracies issued
reservations that excused them from those obligations. Authoritarian states entered the treaties in
return for bribes or in response to threats, and, according to the empirical research, ignored them.
Transitional states seem to be the only states that have changed their behavior, if the empirical
research is to be believed, but in any event these states entered the treaties because transitional
liberal governments hoped to lock in liberal rights.12 Thus, the human rights treaties comply with
International Paretianism.
Finally, consider the range of international institutions. Most such institutions are set up
to serve certain interests of states—to maintain peace or enhance trade, for example—while at
the same time they are designed so that states have significant opportunities to protect their
interests in case they find themselves in a minority. For nearly all major international institutions,
one or more of the following propositions is correct. (1) They make policy through consensus or
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subject to strict supermajority rules, so nearly all states possess vetoes (the United Nations, 13 the
WTO, the Law of the Sea Authority). (2) States can and do undercut these institutions’ powers
by stipulating that the states will be immune to certain of those powers (the International Court
of Justice). (3) The institutions do not possess formal legal authority and so cannot issue binding
rules or orders (the International Labor Standards Organization, the World Health Organization,
the UN Human Rights Council and other human rights committees and commissions). (4) They
lack enforcement power (all international institutions). (5) States can opt out of the institution at
any time (virtually all international institutions). (6) States may avail themselves of the benefits
provided by institution if they wish but are not obliged to (the IMF, the World Bank). (7) The
institution may issue binding orders but states must rely on self-help for a remedy (the WTO
dispute resolution system). (8) An institution with apparently strong powers in practice never
uses them, uses them only with the consent of the affected state, or uses them against only the
very weakest states (the International Criminal Court). Thus, nearly all of the decisions made by
these institutions will roughly satisfy International Paretianism, as states that object to them can
block them, opt out of them, or otherwise avoid their force.14
It is this historical experience, and not some a priori axiom, which underlies the
assumption of International Paretianism. Philosophers and others who argue for a climate treaty
that rights past injustices, redistributes to the poor, and achieves other goals that violate
International Paretianism bear the burden of explaining why the world’s countries would
suddenly change their behavior in such a radical way. They have not carried that burden.
II. International Paretianism and a Climate Treaty
The implications of International Paretianism for a climate treaty are straightforward: the
treaty must be designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the status quo. A
requirement of International Paretianism should not be a barrier to the negotiation of a climate
treaty. Scientific evidence strongly suggests that humanity will be worse off in the future if
climate mitigation efforts are not made. Mitigating therefore creates a surplus relative to the
status quo, and this surplus can be distributed among the states. The surplus will be large enough
to compensate even those states that will not be harmed by climate change (if there are any) and
thus would otherwise be net losers given their treaty obligations. International Paretianism has
nothing to say about how this surplus should be distributed; on that question, other pragmatic or
ethical concerns can be brought to bear.

13
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This argument raises a few puzzles. International Paretianism rests on the self-interest of
states. If states are self-interested, then they will seek to maximize their gain from a treaty. But
that means that states will not be satisfied with being better off than in the status quo; it means
that states will also seek the largest possible portion of the surplus. Accordingly, there is no room
for any ethical discussion even about the distribution of the surplus, which will presumably
reflect the relative bargaining power of the states.
This is a coherent objection to International Paretianism, and we do not know whether it
is correct or not. One possible response is that as a matter of political psychology, voters and
other constituents will object to a treaty that makes them worse off than the status quo, but not to
a treaty that makes them less better off than a feasible alternative but otherwise makes them
better off than the status quo. Perhaps, there is some agency slack, and so well-motivated leaders
might do the right thing for the globe once they are satisfied that their own populations will not
punish them.
If the objection is correct, then there is little room for ethical discussion of any kind.
However, even if the objection is correct, a climate treaty will be socially desirable from a
welfarist point of view. Climate mitigation will occur, climate change will be reduced, and
people around the world will be better off than they would otherwise. The outcome will not be as
fair as other imaginable but infeasible treaties, but it will be better than the status quo.
A second puzzle is how we should consider the position of many developing states
(including China) that they will not enter a treaty unless the treaty redistributes wealth to them,
for the sake of distributive or corrective justice or some other conception of justice or fairness.
One might argue that those states conceive their self-interest as requiring the type of
redistribution that International Paretianism rules out. To put this more concretely, suppose that
the governments are sincere, and that their populations will refuse to accept a treaty that does not
redistribute wealth to them.
Under our approach, the moral norms that influence the public must be cashed out in
terms of the state’s self-interest. And it turns out that there are only two possibilities. First,
suppose the public of, say, India would force the government to reject any treaty that either
imposed positive obligations on India or failed to fully compensated India for its burdens, or
indeed that failed to redistribute wealth to India beyond any climate benefits.15 If the amount that
India demanded is greater than the surplus generated by the treaty, then a treaty becomes
impossible. It is conceptually little different from a hypothetical treaty between India and the
United States under which the United States is obligated to pay India $100 billion in return for
nothing at all. We do not believe the United States would enter such a treaty, nor, accordingly, a
treaty that gave the United States $50 billion in climate benefits at a cost of $150 billion.
15
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Second, suppose that the Indian public would prevent India from ratifying a treaty that
failed to give India a large portion of the surplus but did not fully deplete the surplus. In that
case, then the United States and other countries would have no choice but to give India a larger
portion of the surplus than they would otherwise. This is consistent with International
Paretianism.16
Note that moral and political argument that persuades Indians, Chinese, Brazilians, and
other people that they are entitled to a large portion of the surplus generated a climate treaty
could derail such a treaty because the surplus is finite whereas the amount of money that people
might think appropriate to compensate them for moral harms is potentially unlimited.
Another question is the role that altruism may play in the design of a climate treaty. As
we argue in Climate Change Justice, wealthy states display a positive but low degree of altruism
toward other states. For convenience let us define the “altruism fund” as the monetized value of
the goods, services, or money that wealthy states are willing to give to poor states solely for the
well-being of people in those poor states, and not in return for strategic benefits. If the altruism
fund is fixed (in the sense of a percentage of GDP)—that is, it reflects the exogenous preferences
of people living in the wealthy states—then an efficient climate treaty that mitigated climate
effects at least cost, and that itself has no altruistic component, should nonetheless benefit poor
countries both directly (by reducing climate change) and indirectly (by freeing up money in the
rich states that can be used for altruistic purposes). This should help poor people more than a
climate treaty that benefited poor countries by inefficiently limiting the obligations of poor
countries, and we suspect that it would be fairer and easier to administer than a climate treaty
that included negotiated monetary transfers from rich to poor, as these would be difficult to
change in response to changing conditions (and may be offset by behavior not banned by the
treaty). Accordingly, we remain persuaded that a climate treaty is most likely not a good way to
redistribute wealth.
What of the possibility that the state’s interest is endogenous, and that the state’s
perceived self-interest could change in response to, for example, moral argument? This is
probably the assumption of commentators who argue that International Paretianism is vacuous.17
Suppose, for example, that American citizens were persuaded that the United States has a moral
obligation to bear the bulk of the climate burden because the United States is wealthier than most
other states, and because the United States is responsible for a large portion of the greenhousegas emissions in the atmosphere.

16
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As noted above, our conception of International Paretianism rules out such a possibility
because we believe that states (and not just the United States) define their self-interest in
narrower terms, oriented mainly toward wealth and security. And our conception is based on our
reading of history. Thus, we do not expect Americans (or people in other countries) to define
their national interest so capaciously because they never have in the past.
Still, it is possible that people’s moral views will change, and that is why we devoted a
fair amount of the book examining the moral arguments in play. We concluded that most are not
strong even on their own terms. The corrective justice arguments are not persuasive. Nor are the
various equal sharing arguments grounded in fairness. While there are strong moral arguments
for redistributing wealth to poor people in poor nations,18 there are immense practical problems
that suggest that foreign aid should be pursued outside of a climate treaty, if at all. Moreover,
even if people accepted these arguments, a climate treaty that imposed emissions reduction
burdens on some countries and not others based on ethical rather than economic considerations
would likely vastly increase the cost of stabilizing the atmosphere. A treaty that allowed
economic considerations to determine where emissions reductions take place but that imposed
the monetary burdens on a limited set of countries would simply be a transfer of wealth, which
would be unlikely to be accepted by many countries.
Thus, even if Americans were to take seriously the ethical arguments of philosophers, it
seems unlikely that many of them would be persuaded that a climate treaty should impose
disproportionate burdens on the United States, and likewise for people in other rich countries. All
of this suggests that if we are to achieve a climate treaty in the near future, it is time to focus on
the real objective of such a treaty, which is to reduce climate emissions at an acceptable cost.

Professor Eric Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eric_posner@law.uchicago.edu
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